"Item Id","Item URI","Dublin Core:Title","Dublin Core:Subject","Dublin Core:Description","Dublin Core:Creator","Dublin Core:Source","Dublin Core:Publisher","Dublin Core:Date","Dublin Core:Contributor","Dublin Core:Rights","Dublin Core:Relation","Dublin Core:Format","Dublin Core:Language","Dublin Core:Type","Dublin Core:Identifier","Dublin Core:Coverage","Item Type Metadata:Bibliography","Item Type Metadata:Biographical Text","Item Type Metadata:Occupation","Item Type Metadata:Death Date","Item Type Metadata:Birthplace","Item Type Metadata:Text","Item Type Metadata:Player","Item Type Metadata:Access","Item Type Metadata:Alternate URL","Item Type Metadata:Citation","Item Type Metadata:Accessibility","Item Type Metadata:Abstract","Item Type Metadata:Read Online","Item Type Metadata:Additional Exercise","Item Type Metadata:Email Body","Item Type Metadata:Interviewer","Item Type Metadata:Interviewee","Item Type Metadata:Location","Item Type Metadata:Transcription","Item Type Metadata:Local URL","Item Type Metadata:Original Format","Item Type Metadata:Physical Dimensions","Item Type Metadata:Duration","Item Type Metadata:Compression","Item Type Metadata:Producer","Item Type Metadata:Director","Item Type Metadata:Bit Rate/Frequency","Item Type Metadata:Time Summary","Item Type Metadata:Birth Date","Item Type Metadata:Subject Line","Item Type Metadata:From","Item Type Metadata:To","Item Type Metadata:CC","Item Type Metadata:BCC","Item Type Metadata:Number of Attachments","Item Type Metadata:Standards","Item Type Metadata:Objectives","Item Type Metadata:Materials","Item Type Metadata:Lesson Plan Text","Item Type Metadata:URL","Item Type Metadata:Event Type","Item Type Metadata:Participants","PDF Text:Text",tags,file,itemType,collection,public,featured
975,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/975,"Two Middle East respiratory syndrome vaccines: first step for other coronavirus vaccines?",Laboratory,"Since the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) in 2002, the emergence and expansion of endemic and epidemic coronaviruses has been accelerating on a scale not seen for any other group of viruses with pandemic potential.","Modjarrad, Kayvon, and Jerome H. Kim.",,,2020-04-20,"2023-12-18 skipped for review by Lab, bump to next round",,,,,Publication,Laboratory,2024-04-01,,,,,,,,,,"Modjarrad, Kayvon, and Jerome H. Kim. 2020. ""Two Middle East respiratory syndrome vaccines: first step for other coronavirus vaccines?"" The Lancet Infectious Diseases.
","Free online open access",,https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(20)30317-0/fulltext,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(20)30317-0/fulltext,,,,"2019-nCoV,Coronavirus,COVID-19,MERS-CoV,R-Lab,R-Res&Pub,SARS,SARS-CoV-2,Vaccine Study",,Publication,Discover,1,0
678,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/678,"Transmission dynamics of 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV)","Infection Control","Since December 29, 2019, pneumonia infection with 2019-nCoV has rapidly spread out from Wuhan, Hubei Province, China to most others provinces and other counties. However, the transmission dynamics of 2019-nCoV remain unclear.","Liu, Tao, Jianxiong Hu, Min Kang, Lifeng Lin, Haojie Zhong, Jianpeng Xiao, Guanhao He, Tie Song, Qiong Huang, Zuhua Rong, Aiping Deng, Weilin Zeng, Xiaohua Tan, Siqing Zeng, Zhihua Zhu, Jiansen Li, Donghua Wan, Jing Lu, Huihong Deng, Jianfeng He, and Wenjun Ma.",,,2020-01-26,"2022-12-07 general asset review - IPC",,,,,Publication,,2023-12-10,,,,,,,,,,"Liu, Tao, Jianxiong Hu, Min Kang, Lifeng Lin, Haojie Zhong, Jianpeng Xiao, Guanhao He, Tie Song, Qiong Huang, Zuhua Rong, Aiping Deng, Weilin Zeng, Xiaohua Tan, Siqing Zeng, Zhihua Zhu, Jiansen Li, Donghua Wan, Jing Lu, Huihong Deng, Jianfeng He, and Wenjun Ma. 2020. ""Transmission dynamics of 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV)."" bioRxiv:2020.01.25.919787.","Free online","
Summary
Background Since December 29, 2019, pneumonia infection with 2019-nCoV has rapidly spread out from Wuhan, Hubei Province, China to most others provinces and other counties. However, the transmission dynamics of 2019-nCoV remain unclear.
Methods Data of confirmed 2019-nCoV cases before January 23, 2020 were collected from medical records, epidemiological investigations or official websites. Data of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) cases in Guangdong Province during 2002-2003 were obtained from Guangdong Provincial Center for Disease Control and Prevention (GDCDC). Exponential Growth (EG) and maximum likelihood estimation (ML) were applied to estimate the reproductive number (R) of 2019-nCoV and SARS.
Findings As of January 23, 2020, a total of 830 confirmed 2019-nCoV cases were identified across China, and 9 cases were reported overseas. The average incubation duration of 2019-nCoV infection was 4.8days. The average period from onset of symptoms to isolation of 2019-nCoV and SARS cases were 2.9 and 4.2 days, respectively. The R values of 2019-nCoV were 2.90 (95%CI: 2.32-3.63) and 2.92 (95%CI: 2.28-3.67) estimated using EG and ML respectively, while the corresponding R values of SARS-CoV were 1.77 (95%CI: 1.37-2.27) and 1.85 (95%CI: 1.32-2.49). We observe a decreasing trend of the period from onset to isolation and R values of both 2019-nCoV and SARS-CoV.
Interpretation The 2019-nCoV may have a higher pandemic risk than SARS broken out in 2003. The implemented public-health efforts have significantly decreased the pandemic risk of 2019-nCoV. However, more rigorous control and prevention strategies and measures to contain its further spread.
Funding National Key Research and Development Program of China, Science and Technology Program of Guangdong Province, and Guangzhou Science and technology Plan Project.
",https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.01.25.919787v1.full.pdf,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.01.25.919787v1.full,,,,"Airborne Transmission,Coronavirus,COVID-19,Droplet Transmission,Infection Prevention and Control,R-IPC,R-Res&Pub,SARS",,Publication,Discover,1,0
666,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/666,"Tracing the SARS-coronavirus.",Research,"Four coronaviruses (HCoV-229E, HCoV-OC43, HCoV-NL63, HCoV-HKU1) are endemic in humans and mainly associated with mild respiratory illnesses; whereas the other two coronaviruses [Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV)] present as emerging infections causing severe respiratory syndrome.","Chan PK, Chan MC.",,,2013-08,,,,,,Publication,,,,,,,,,,,,"Chan, Paul K. S., and Martin C. W. Chan. 2013. ""Tracing the SARS-coronavirus."" J Thorac Dis 5 Suppl 2 (Suppl 2):S118-S21.","© Pioneer Bioscience Publishing Company. All rights reserved. Articles from Journal of Thoracic Disease are provided to PubMed courtesy of AME Publications. Available to read on Journal website.","
Abstract
Four coronaviruses (HCoV-229E, HCoV-OC43, HCoV-NL63, HCoV-HKU1) are endemic in humans and mainly associated with mild respiratory illnesses; whereas the other two coronaviruses [Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV)] present as emerging infections causing severe respiratory syndrome. Coronaviruses evolve by accumulation of point mutations and recombination of genomes among different strains or species. Mammalian coronaviruses including those infect humans are evolved from bat coronaviruses. While SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV are genetically closely related to bat coronaviruses, intermediate host(s) is (are) likely to be involved in the emergence and cross-species transmission of these novel human viruses. High prevalence of SARS-like coronaviruses have been found from masked palm civet cats and raccoon dogs collected from markets around the time of outbreaks in humans, but these animals are likely to be a transient accidental host rather than a persisting reservoir. More research is needed to elucidate the ecology of coronaviruses. Vigilance and surveillance should be maintained to promptly identify newly emerged coronaviruses.
",http://jtd.amegroups.com/article/view/1246,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23977431,,,,"Coronavirus,COVID-19,Epidemiology,MERS-CoV,R-Res&Pub,SARS",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/4b3443132fb944757f24d7950d4e8d5e.pdf,Publication,Discover,1,0
659,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/659,"Surveillance Case Definitions for Human Infection with Novel Coronavirus (nCoV): Interim Guidance V1 ","Infection Control","Interim guidance for surveillance of the novel coronavirus (nCoV) recently identified in Wuhan, China (2019-nCoV).
Global Surveillance for human infection with coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Updated.",WHO,,,2020-02-27,"2022-12-07 general asset review - IPC",,,,,,,2023-12-10,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.who.int/publications-detail/global-surveillance-for-human-infection-with-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov),,,,"Coronavirus,COVID-19,Infection Prevention and Control,MERS-CoV,R-IPC,SARS",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/a7431db5725a9c9a2806185ac7c5b998.png,Hyperlink,Discover,1,0
753,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/753,"Risk Factors for SARS Transmission from Patients Requiring Intubation: A Multicentre Investigation in Toronto, Canada","Infection Control","In the 2003 Toronto SARS outbreak, SARS-CoV was transmitted in hospitals despite adherence to infection control procedures.","Raboud, Janet, Altynay Shigayeva, Allison McGeer, Erika Bontovics, Martin Chapman, Denise Gravel, Bonnie Henry, Stephen Lapinsky, Mark Loeb, L. Clifford McDonald, Marianna Ofner, Shirley Paton, Donna Reynolds, Damon Scales, Sandy Shen, Andrew Simor, Thomas Stewart, Mary Vearncombe, Dick Zoutman, and Karen Green.",,,2010-05-19,"2022-12-07 general asset review - IPC (change R-T&C)",,,,,,,2023-12-10,,,,,,,,,,"Raboud, Janet, Altynay Shigayeva, Allison McGeer, Erika Bontovics, Martin Chapman, Denise Gravel, Bonnie Henry, Stephen Lapinsky, Mark Loeb, L. Clifford McDonald, Marianna Ofner, Shirley Paton, Donna Reynolds, Damon Scales, Sandy Shen, Andrew Simor, Thomas Stewart, Mary Vearncombe, Dick Zoutman, and Karen Green. 2010. ""Risk factors for SARS transmission from patients requiring intubation: a multicentre investigation in Toronto, Canada."" PLoS One 5 (5):e10717-e.
","Free online Open Access.","
BACKGROUND:
In the 2003 Toronto SARS outbreak, SARS-CoV was transmitted in hospitals despite adherence to infection control procedures. Considerable controversy resulted regarding which procedures and behaviours were associated with the greatest risk of SARS-CoV transmission.
METHODS:
A retrospective cohort study was conducted to identify risk factors for transmission of SARS-CoV during intubation from laboratory confirmed SARS patients to HCWs involved in their care. All SARS patients requiring intubation during the Toronto outbreak were identified. All HCWs who provided care to intubated SARS patients during treatment or transportation and who entered a patient room or had direct patient contact from 24 hours before to 4 hours after intubation were eligible for this study. Data was collected on patients by chart review and on HCWs by interviewer-administered questionnaire. Generalized estimating equation (GEE) logistic regression models and classification and regression trees (CART) were used to identify risk factors for SARS transmission.
RESULTS:
45 laboratory-confirmed intubated SARS patients were identified. Of the 697 HCWs involved in their care, 624 (90%) participated in the study. SARS-CoV was transmitted to 26 HCWs from 7 patients; 21 HCWs were infected by 3 patients. In multivariate GEE logistic regression models, presence in the room during fiberoptic intubation (OR = 2.79, p = .004) or ECG (OR = 3.52, p = .002), unprotected eye contact with secretions (OR = 7.34, p = .001), patient APACHE II score > or = 20 (OR = 17.05, p = .009) and patient Pa0(2)/Fi0(2) ratio < or = 59 (OR = 8.65, p = .001) were associated with increased risk of transmission of SARS-CoV. In CART analyses, the four covariates which explained the greatest amount of variation in SARS-CoV transmission were covariates representing individual patients.
CONCLUSION:
Close contact with the airway of severely ill patients and failure of infection control practices to prevent exposure to respiratory secretions were associated with transmission of SARS-CoV. Rates of transmission of SARS-CoV varied widely among patients.
",https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0010717,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20502660,,,,"Airborne Transmission,Coronavirus,Infection Prevention and Control,Occupational Exposure,R-T&C,Respiratory Pathogen,SARS",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/7538bf5600e0bc731653f134a0a8737b.PDF,Publication,Discover,1,0
658,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/658,"Questions fréquentes sur les nouveaux coronavirus","Contenu Français","Les coronavirus forment une vaste famille de virus qui sont à l’origine de diverses affections, allant du rhume banal à des maladies plus graves comme le syndrome respiratoire du Moyen-Orient (MERS) et le syndrome respiratoire aigu sévère (SRAS). (WHO). This page is available in English.",WHO,,,2020-01-09,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.who.int/fr/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/question-and-answers-hub,,,,"Coronavirus,COVID-19,Français,French,MERS-CoV,R-Gen,SARS,Vaccine Study",,Hyperlink,,1,0
656,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/656,"Q&A on coronaviruses",General,"A page of questions and answers about coronaviruses. Coronaviruses are a large family of viruses that are known to cause illness ranging from the common cold to more severe diseases such as Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). (WHO). This page is available in French.",WHO,,,2020-01-09,"2024-03-28 by J. Mundy – General subject – setting first review day 2025-01-01",,,,,,,2025-01-01,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/q-a-coronaviruses,,,,"Coronavirus,COVID-19,MERS-CoV,R-Gen,SARS,Vaccine Study",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/6ddba3c532b7f9c57c923322b4481f5c.png,Hyperlink,Discover,1,0
312,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/312,"Prioritizing diseases for research and development in emergency contexts",General,"Worldwide, the number of potential pathogens is very large, while the resources for disease research and development (R&D) is limited. To ensure efforts under WHO’s R&D Blueprint are focused and productive, a list of diseases and pathogens are prioritized for R&D in public health emergency contexts.","World Health Organization",,,2022,"2024-03-28 by J. Mundy – General subject – setting first review day 2025-01-01",,,,,,,2025-01-01,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.who.int/activities/prioritizing-diseases-for-research-and-development-in-emergency-contexts,,,,"Coronavirus,Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever (CCHF),Ebola,Epidemic,Experimental Drugs,Lassa,Marburg,Medical Surveillance,MERS-CoV,Mpox,Orthopox Virus,Outbreaks,Pandemic,Plague,Prophylaxis,Public Health,R-Gen,Respiratory Pathogen,SARS,Special Pathogens,Therapeutics,Vaccine Study,Variola,Viral Hemorrhagic Fever",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/8df853d7cbf6e38897cc9822e2f157b2.png,Guide,Discover,1,0
612,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/612,"NYC Health + Hospitals Special Pathogens Response Matrix","Emergency Management","Matrix with response to different special pathogens. ","NYC Health + Hospitals",,,2023-12-15,"2023-12-15 by Darrell Ruby and Amy Mead/EM WG - recommended update MPox section. Syra Madad submitted updated version.",,"Y - D0.1EM/D0.2EM - Qualtrics # 505",,,,,2025-12-15,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Coronavirus,Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever (CCHF),Ebola,Flu,Influenza,Lassa,Marburg,MERS-CoV,Mpox,Plague,Protocol,R-EM,SARS,Special Pathogens,Viral Hemorrhagic Fever",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/2d96838a144eb3974e7dc8ea2e26ec3a.pdf,Guide,Develop,1,0
660,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/660,"Nextstrain - Phylogeny of SARS-like betacoronaviruses including novel coronavirus from Wuhan",General,"Nextstrain is an open-source project to harness the scientific and public health potential of pathogen genome data. Datasets are available on ebola, flu, enterovirus, WNV, tb, lassa, mumps, zikka, dengue, ncov, and measles.
Phylogeny of SARS-like betacoronaviruses including novel coronavirus from Wuhan using data generated by the Shanghai Public Health Clinical Center & School of Public Health, the National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention, the Institute of Pathogen Biology, and the Wuhan Institute of Virology shared via GISAID
",Nextstrain,,,2020-01-16,"2024-03-28 by J. Mundy – General subject – setting first review day 2025-01-01",,,,,,,2025-01-01,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://nextstrain.org/groups/blab/sars-like-cov,,,,"Coronavirus,COVID-19,Epidemiology,Public Health,R-Gen,SARS,Virology",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/adc01478dcd1b050259b155de3c2fffd.png,Hyperlink,Discover,1,0
774,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/774,"Nextstrain - Novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) situation reports and latest data and analysis",Research,"
Nextstrain is incorporating nCoV genomes as soon as they are shared and providing analyses and situation reports. Please see below for the latest updates.
",Nextstrain,,,2020-03-04,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://nextstrain.org/#ncov,,,,"2019-nCoV,Coronavirus,COVID-19,Epidemiology,MERS-CoV,R-Res&Pub,SARS,SARS-CoV-2",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/3f8657d9839c4fbc3bcfc9b8a4911757.png,Hyperlink,Discover,1,0
662,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/662,"Nextstrain - Genetic diversity of betacoronaviruses including novel coronavirus from Wuhan",General,"Nextstrain is an open-source project to harness the scientific and public health potential of pathogen genome data. Datasets are available on ebola, flu, enterovirus, WNV, tb, lassa, mumps, zikka, dengue, ncov, and measles.
Genetic diversity of betacoronaviruses including novel coronavirus from Wuhan using data generated by Yong-Zhen Zhang (Shanghai Public Health Clinical Center) and colleagues
",Nextstrain,,,2020-01-11,"2024-03-28 by J. Mundy – General subject – setting first review day 2025-01-01",,,,,,,2025-01-01,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://nextstrain.org/groups/blab/beta-cov,,,,"Coronavirus,COVID-19,Epidemiology,MERS-CoV,Public Health,R-Gen,SARS,Virology",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/915d4972d700dc78d9b542515c528597.png,Hyperlink,Discover,1,0
672,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/672,"Human Coronavirus 229E Remains Infectious on Common Touch Surface Materials","Infection Control","The evolution of new and reemerging historic virulent strains of respiratory viruses from animal reservoirs is a significant threat to human health.","Warnes, Sarah L., Zoë R. Little, and C. William Keevil.",,,2015-11-10,"2022-12-07 general asset review - IPC",,,,,Publication,,2025-12-10,,,,,,,,,,"Warnes, Sarah L., Zoë R. Little, and C. William Keevil. 2015. ""Human Coronavirus 229E Remains Infectious on Common Touch Surface Materials."" mBio 6 (6):e01697-15.","Free online","
Abstract
The evolution of new and reemerging historic virulent strains of respiratory viruses from animal reservoirs is a significant threat to human health. Inefficient human-to-human transmission of zoonotic strains may initially limit the spread of transmission, but an infection may be contracted by touching contaminated surfaces. Enveloped viruses are often susceptible to environmental stresses, but the human coronaviruses responsible for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) have recently caused increasing concern of contact transmission during outbreaks. We report here that pathogenic human coronavirus 229E remained infectious in a human lung cell culture model following at least 5 days of persistence on a range of common nonbiocidal surface materials, including polytetrafluoroethylene (Teflon; PTFE), polyvinyl chloride (PVC), ceramic tiles, glass, silicone rubber, and stainless steel. We have shown previously that noroviruses are destroyed on copper alloy surfaces. In this new study, human coronavirus 229E was rapidly inactivated on a range of copper alloys (within a few minutes for simulated fingertip contamination) and Cu/Zn brasses were very effective at lower copper concentration. Exposure to copper destroyed the viral genomes and irreversibly affected virus morphology, including disintegration of envelope and dispersal of surface spikes. Cu(I) and Cu(II) moieties were responsible for the inactivation, which was enhanced by reactive oxygen species generation on alloy surfaces, resulting in even faster inactivation than was seen with nonenveloped viruses on copper. Consequently, copper alloy surfaces could be employed in communal areas and at any mass gatherings to help reduce transmission of respiratory viruses from contaminated surfaces and protect the public health.
IMPORTANCE:
Respiratory viruses are responsible for more deaths globally than any other infectious agent. Animal coronaviruses that ""host jump"" to humans result in severe infections with high mortality, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and, more recently, Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). We show here that a closely related human coronavirus, 229E, which causes upper respiratory tract infection in healthy individuals and serious disease in patients with comorbidities, remained infectious on surface materials common to public and domestic areas for several days. The low infectious dose means that this is a significant infection risk to anyone touching a contaminated surface. However, rapid inactivation, irreversible destruction of viral RNA, and massive structural damage were observed in coronavirus exposed to copper and copper alloy surfaces. Incorporation of copper alloy surfaces in conjunction with effective cleaning regimens and good clinical practice could help to control transmission of respiratory coronaviruses, including MERS and SARS.
Copyright © 2015 Warnes et al.
",https://journals.asm.org/doi/full/10.1128/mBio.01697-15,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26556276,,,,"Contact Transmission,Coronavirus,COVID-19,Infection Prevention and Control,MERS-CoV,R-IPC,R-Res&Pub,SARS",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/14fffec4893422e16e8607ee150b28ef.png,Publication,Discover,1,0
689,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/689,"Hospital Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Planning Tool / Calculator","Infection Control","Purpose: The Hospital Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Planning Tool is designed to help hospitals determine approximate minimum PPE needs based on special pathogen category and a number of facility specific variables. Calculators are included for Ebola Virus Disease/Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (EVD/VHF) as well as special respiratory pathogens such as Middle East Respiratory Syndrome/Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (MERS/SARS), and for pandemic influenza. The tool does not provide information for less virulent pathogens. It is not intended as a clinical tool and should be used as a pre-incident planning tool and NOT during an outbreak.
You can find it in Plans, Tools, and Templates.","ASPR TRACIE",,,2018,"2022-01-19 by Beth Beam",,,,,,,2025-01-19,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://files.asprtracie.hhs.gov/documents/aspr-tracie-hospital-ppe-planning-tool.pdf,,,,"Coronavirus,Ebola,Infection Prevention and Control,MERS-CoV,Personal Protective Equipment (PPE),R-PPE,SARS,Special Pathogens,Viral Hemorrhagic Fever","https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/4da5a2de22ddb0c1a3cf41c61334f68a.pdf,https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/2e6c13dc7b070e14c2f88c696b83a419.xlsx",Hyperlink,Develop,1,0
942,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/942,"High-Consequence Infectious Disease Workshop",Pre-hospital,"This webcast aims to increase awareness about standard and transmission-based infection-control practices and teaches learners how the “Identify, Isolates and Inform” strategy can improve their ability to recognize and manage an infectious disease threats like COVID-19, MERS (Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome) or Ebola.
","JEMS Webcast, Alexander Isakov, Michael J. Carr, Ben Tysor, and Wade Miles",,,2020-04-07,"2022-12-07 general asset review - IPC
2023-03-31 by J Mundy - change to R-EMS for next review
2024-03-27 EMS/Pre-Hospital never reviewed – bump to next quarter",,,,,,,2024-06-10,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"A certificate of attendance will be offered. This webcast is CAPCE certified and attendees* that watch the webcast will receive 1 hour of CE credit!",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Attendees will become familiar with the ASPR TRACIE EMS Infectious Disease Playbook and will consider operational challenges and strategies for transport and management of patients with high-consequence infectious diseases.",,,https://event.webcasts.com/starthere.jsp?ei=1295231&tp_key=f3c48f873b,Webinar,,,"2019-nCoV,Coronavirus,COVID-19,Ebola,Emergency Management,EMS,Identify,Infection Prevention and Control,Inform,Isolate,MERS-CoV,R-EMS,R-PreH,SARS,Webinar",,Webinar,Develop,1,0
571,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/571,"Evaluation of a Redesigned Personal Protective Equipment Gown","Infection Control","In healthcare, the goal of personal protective equipment (PPE) is to protect healthcare personnel (HCP) and patients from body fluids and infectious organisms via contact, droplet, or airborne transmission.","Drews, Frank A., Diane Mulvey, Kristina Stratford, Matthew H. Samore, and Jeanmarie Mayer.",,,2019-10-01,"2022-01-10 by PPE group Shawn Gibbs",,,,,Publication,,2025-01-10,,,,,,,,,,"Drews, Frank A., Diane Mulvey, Kristina Stratford, Matthew H. Samore, and Jeanmarie Mayer. 2019. ""Evaluation of a Redesigned Personal Protective Equipment Gown."" Clinical Infectious Diseases 69 (Supplement_3):S199-S205.
","Online with journal subscription (Oxford Academic).","Abstract
Background
In healthcare, the goal of personal protective equipment (PPE) is to protect healthcare personnel (HCP) and patients from body fluids and infectious organisms via contact, droplet, or airborne transmission. The critical importance of using PPE properly is highlighted by 2 potentially fatal viral infections, severe acute respiratory syndrome–associated coronavirus and Ebola virus, where HCP became infected while caring for patients due to errors in the use of PPE. However, PPE in dealing with less dangerous, but highly infectious organisms is important as well. This work proposes a framework to test and evaluate PPE with a focus on gown design.
Methods
An observational study identified issues with potential for contamination related to gown use. After redesigning the existing gown, a high-fidelity patient simulator study with 40 HCP as participants evaluated the gown redesign using 2 commonly performed tasks. Variables of interest were nonadherence to procedural standards, use problems with the gown during task performance, and usability and cognitive task load ratings of the standard and redesigned gowns.
Results
While no differences were found in terms of nonadherence and use problems between the current and the redesigned gown, differences in usability and task load ratings suggested that the redesigned gown is perceived more favorably by HCP.
Conclusions
This work proposes a framework to guide the evaluation of PPE. The results suggest that the current design of the PPE gown can be improved in usability and user satisfaction. Although our data did not find an increase in adherence to protocol when using the redesigned gown, it is likely that higher usability and lower task load could result in higher adherence over longer periods of use.
",https://academic.oup.com/cid/article/69/Supplement_3/S199/5568511,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31517973,,,,"Airborne Transmission,Contact Transmission,Coronavirus,Droplet Transmission,Ebola,Gown,Personal Protective Equipment (PPE),R-PPE,R-Res&Pub,SARS",,Publication,Discover,1,0
16,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/16,"EMS Infectious Disease Playbook","Emergency Medical Services","ASPR TRACIE Transport playbook: This playbook synthesizes multiple sources of information in a single planning document addressing the full spectrum of infectious agents to create a concise reference resource for emergency medical services (EMS) agencies developing their service policies. The information can be incorporated into agency standard operating procedures and reviewed by the EMS medical director.
Replaces 2017 version.","ASPR TRACIE",,,2023-06,"2022-01-19 by Beth Beam
2023-03-31 by J Mundy change to just R-EMS for next review
2023-07-07 by J Mundy updated at request of Alex Isakov",,,,,,"Emergency Medical Services",2025-01-19,,,,,,,,,,"ASPR TRACIE. (2023). EMS Infectious Disease Playbook. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response.",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://asprtracie.hhs.gov/technical-resources/resource/4442/ems-infectious-disease-playbook,,,,"Airborne Transmission,CONOPS,Contact Transmission,Donning and Doffing,Droplet Transmission,Ebola,Emergency Management,EMS,Infection Prevention and Control,MERS-CoV,Novel Pathogen,Patient Transport,Person Under Investigation (PUI),Personal Protective Equipment (PPE),Pre-hospital Transport,R-EMS,R-PreH,Respiratory Pathogen,SARS,Special Pathogens,Viral Hemorrhagic Fever",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/287f5d5ebe8065e23b27152089392a62.pdf,Guide,Discover,1,0
1771,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/1771,"EMS Biosafety Transport for Operators",Pre-Hospital,"The course aims to increase understanding about standard and transmission-based infection control practices and provides education about high consequence infectious diseases like COVID-19, Mpox, Ebola Virus Disease, Smallpox, SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), MERS (Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome), novel influenza viruses, like H5N1, and seasonal as well as pandemic influenza.
Education about these diseases, specifically the clinical course of the disease, the availability of medical countermeasures and appropriate infection control measures is essential for developing the competencies and the confidence to manage and transport patients suspected or confirmed to be infected with a high consequence infectious disease.
The course also describes operational considerations for management and transport of patients with seriohig consequence infectious diseases, to include, selection of PPE, donning and doffing of PPE, modification of the ambulance, destination considerations, decontamination and disinfection of the ambulance and durable medical equipment, waste management and post-mission medical surveillance.",NETEC,,,2023-04-13,,,,,,"Online Course",,2024-04-12,,,,,,,,"Free online with free account.",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"The estimated time to complete this enduring material is 240 minutes. ",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"At the conclusion of this enduring material, the participants should be better able to:
- Discuss high consequence infectious diseases (smallpox, Mpox, COVID-19, SARS, MERS, Ebola, novel influenza) including standard and transmission-based infection control procedures.
- Describe the health care team’s roles and responsibilities involving implementation of a hierarchy of controls to prevent inadvertent exposure to infectious bodily fluids through the use of appropriate PPE and implementation of infection prevention guidelines for ambulances.
- Articulate processes required for safe management of wastes and post-mission health monitoring related to associated risks of exposures.
CEUs
In support of improving patient care, this activity has been planned and implemented by the University of Nebraska Medical Center and NETEC. University of Nebraska Medical Center is jointly accredited by the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME), the Accreditation Council for Pharmacy Education (ACPE), and the American Nurses Credentialing Center (ANCC), to provide continuing education for the healthcare team.
PHYSICIANS/PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS
The University of Nebraska Medical Center designates this enduring material for a maximum of 4.0 AMA PRA Category 1 Credits™. Physicians should claim only the credit commensurate with the extent of their participation in the activity.
NURSES/NURSE PRACTITIONERS
The University of Nebraska Medical Center designates this activity for 4.0 ANCC contact hours. Nurses should only claim credit for the actual time spent participating in the activity.
EMS
The University of Nebraska Medical Center, Center for Continuing Education, EMS and Trauma Division approves this educational opportunity for 4.0 hours of Emergency Medical Services Continuing Education. (Deb VonSeggern, NRP, EMSI)
",,,https://courses.netec.org/courses/ems-biosafety-transport-for-operators,,,,"CEU,CEUs,COVID-19,Ebola,EMS,Infection Prevention and Control,Influenza,MERS-CoV,Mpox,Online Course,Pre-Hospital,R-EMS,SARS,Special Pathogens",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/01eaeca3f4bae3401c486c883cfd57fd.png,"Online Course",Develop,1,1
390,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/390,"Emerging infectious agents/Agents infectieux émergents","Contenu Français","De nombreuses maladies infectieuses émergentes ou ré-émergentes sont survenues au cours des dernières décennies, certaines posant des problèmes de santé publique majeurs. SRAS, MERS-CoV, grippe aviaire hautement pathogène A(H5N1), MERS-CoV, maladie à virus Ebola ont été très préoccupants en raison de la virulence, de la mortalité, des modalités de transmission, de l’impact sur la transmission maternofœtale (Zika).","Chidiac C, Ferry T.",,,2016-11-01,,,,,,Publication,,,,,,,,,,,,"C. Chidiac, and T. Ferry. ""Agents Infectieux Émergents."" Transfusion Clinique et Biologique 23, no. 4 (2016/11/01/ 2016): 253-62.","pay online or through Elsevier","
Abstract
Emergence of many emerging or re-emerging infectious diseases have occurred over the past decade, some of which are major public threat. SARS, MERS-CoV, highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1), Ebola virus disease have raised concerns because of their virulence, their mortality, and/or their modality of transmission, or their impact on maternofoetal transmission (Zika virus). The witness of these emergences have conducted health authorities to have policies and plans and to imagine new organizations for health systems in order to identify any case of highly communicable virulent disease for immediate isolation, and adequate management.
Résumé
De nombreuses maladies infectieuses émergentes ou ré-émergentes sont survenues au cours des dernières décennies, certaines posant des problèmes de santé publique majeurs. SRAS, MERS-CoV, grippe aviaire hautement pathogène A(H5N1), MERS-CoV, maladie à virus Ebola ont été très préoccupants en raison de la virulence, de la mortalité, des modalités de transmission, de l’impact sur la transmission maternofœtale (Zika). La prise de conscience de ces émergences a conduit les autorités sanitaires à élaborer des plans et des recommandations, d’imaginer de nouvelles organisations des systèmes de soins de manière à identifier tout cas de maladie infectieuse émergente hautement transmissible virulente pour isolement immédiat et prise en charge adéquate.
",https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1246782016300428?via%3Dihub,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27644171,,,,"Contact Transmission,Coronavirus,Diagnosis,Droplet Transmission,Ebola,Epidemiology,Flu,Français,French,Infection Prevention and Control,Influenza,International Response,Public Health,R-Res&Pub,SARS,Special Pathogens,Viral Hemorrhagic Fever",,Publication,,1,0
317,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/317,"Ecology of Emerging Zoonotic Diseases",General,"This webinar discusses Nipah virus and Ebola in terms of how human activity increases contact with wildlife and thus zoonotic disease emergence, and discusses interventions that reduce such risk.","CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response (CDC OPHPR)",,,2017-11-02,"2022-03-17 by Anna Yaffee (Adult Care Group) keep in Resource Library
2023-02-19 by Anna Yaffee T&C group Q1 review",,,,,,,2026-02-19,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://emergency.cdc.gov/coca/calls/2017/callinfo_110217.asp,,,,"Avian Influenza,Coronavirus,Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever (CCHF),Ebola,Epidemic,Lassa,Marburg,Nipah (NiV),Outbreaks,Pandemic,Public Health,R-Gen,Respiratory Pathogen,SARS,Special Pathogens,Viral Hemorrhagic Fever,Zoonotic",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/42cc1379f3523ef4c23835c9b4049a9b.png,Webinar,Discover,1,0
679,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/679,"Dynamically Modeling SARS and Other Newly Emerging Respiratory Illnesses: Past, Present, and Future",Research,"The emergence and rapid global spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus in 2002–2003 prompted efforts by modelers to characterize SARS epidemiology and inform control policies. ","Alison P. Galvani.",,,2005-11,,,,,,Publication,,,,,,,,,,,,"Bauch, Chris T., James O. Lloyd-Smith, Megan P. Coffee, and Alison P. Galvani. 2005. ""Dynamically Modeling SARS and Other Newly Emerging Respiratory Illnesses: Past, Present, and Future."" Epidemiology 16 (6):791-801.
","Free through Journal website. Or accessible through jstor or Ovid subscription.","Abstract
The emergence and rapid global spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus in 2002–2003 prompted efforts by modelers to characterize SARS epidemiology and inform control policies. We overview and discuss models for emerging infectious diseases (EIDs), provide a critical survey of SARS modeling literature, and discuss promising future directions for research. We reconcile discrepancies between published estimates of the basic reproductive number R0 for SARS (a crucial epidemiologic parameter), discuss insights regarding SARS control measures that have emerged uniquely from a modeling approach, and argue that high priorities for future modeling of SARS and similar respiratory EIDs should include informing quarantine policy and better understanding the impact of population heterogeneity on transmission patterns.
",https://journals.lww.com/epidem/fulltext/2005/11000/Dynamically_Modeling_SARS_and_Other_Newly_Emerging.13.aspx,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16222170,,,,"Coronavirus,Epidemiology,R-Res&Pub,SARS",,Publication,Discover,1,0
739,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/739,"Different types of door-opening motions as contributing factors to containment failures in hospital isolation rooms","Infection Control","Hospital isolation rooms are vital for the containment (when under negative pressure) of patients with, or the protection (when under positive pressure) of patients, from airborne infectious agents.","Tang, Julian W., Andre Nicolle, Jovan Pantelic, Christian A. Klettner, Ruikun Su, Petri Kalliomaki, Pekka Saarinen, Hannu Koskela, Kari Reijula, Panu Mustakallio, David K. W. Cheong, Chandra Sekhar, and Kwok Wai Tham.",,,2013-06-24,"2022-12-07 general asset review - IPC (change R-PhI)",,"Y - D0.1PI/D0.2PI Qualtrics # 106, original # 3a
Y - D0.1PI/D0.2PI Qualtrics # 107, original # 3b
Y - D0.1PI/D0.2PI Qualtrics # 108, original # 3c
Y - D0.1PI/D0.2PI Qualtrics # 109, original # 3d
Y - D0.1PI/D0.2PI Qualtrics # 110, original # 3e
Y - D0.1PI/D0.2PI Qualtrics # 112, original # 14
Y - D0.1PI/D0.2PI Qualtrics # 113, original # 15",,,Publication,,2023-12-10,,,,,,,,,,"Tang, Julian W., Andre Nicolle, Jovan Pantelic, Christian A. Klettner, Ruikun Su, Petri Kalliomaki, Pekka Saarinen, Hannu Koskela, Kari Reijula, Panu Mustakallio, David K. W. Cheong, Chandra Sekhar, and Kwok Wai Tham. 2013. ""Different Types of Door-Opening Motions as Contributing Factors to Containment Failures in Hospital Isolation Rooms."" PLoS One 8 (6):e66663.
","Free online, open access","
Erratum in
- PLoS One. 2014;9(1). doi:10.1371/annotation/c9cb4143-f96f-4529-ba37-095447a064e3.
Abstract
Hospital isolation rooms are vital for the containment (when under negative pressure) of patients with, or the protection (when under positive pressure) of patients, from airborne infectious agents. Such facilities were essential for the management of highly contagious patients during the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreaks and the more recent 2009 A/H1N1 influenza pandemic. Many different types of door designs are used in the construction of such isolation rooms, which may be related to the space available and affordability. Using colored food dye as a tracer, the qualitative effects of door-opening motions on the dissemination of potentially contaminated air into and out of a single isolation room were visualized and filmed using Reynolds-number-equivalent, small-scale, water-tank models fitted with programmable door-opening and moving human figure motions. Careful scaling considerations involved in the design and construction of these water-tank models enabled these results to be accurately extrapolated to the full-scale situation. Four simple types of door design were tested: variable speed single and double, sliding and hinged doors, in combination with the moving human figure. The resulting video footage was edited, synchronized and presented in a series of split-screen formats. From these experiments, it is clear that double-hinged doors pose the greatest risk of leakage into or out of the room, followed by (in order of decreasing risk) single-hinged, double-sliding and single-sliding doors. The relative effect of the moving human figure on spreading any potential contamination was greatest with the sliding doors, as the bulk airflows induced were large relative to those resulting from these door-opening motions. However, with the hinged doors, the airflows induced by these door-opening motions were significantly greater. Further experiments involving a simulated ventilated environment are required, but from these findings alone, it appears that sliding-doors are far more effective for hospital isolation room containment.
",https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3691190/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23826109,,,,"Coronavirus,Flu,Infection Prevention and Control,Influenza,Isolate,Isolation/Biocontainment,Occupational Exposure,Physical Infrastructure,R-PhIn,R-Res&Pub,SARS,Staff Support,Staffing",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/a8e4b784f64fd906c2b6776ff5364f26.PDF,Publication,Discover,1,0
671,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/671,"Coronavirus survival on healthcare personal protective equipment","Infection Control",,"Casanova, Lisa, William A. Rutala, David J. Weber, and Mark D. Sobsey.",,,2010-05,"2022-01-10 by Shawn Gibbs
2022-01-21 by Lisa (reset to active)",,,,,Publication,,"Do not archive, linked in old blog.",,,,,,,,,,"Casanova, Lisa, William A. Rutala, David J. Weber, and Mark D. Sobsey. 2010. ""Coronavirus Survival on Healthcare Personal Protective Equipment."" Infection Control & Hospital Epidemiology 31 (5):560-1.","Pay online - or through Ovid subscription",,https://doi.org/10.1086/652452,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20350196,,,,"Archived,Coronavirus,COVID-19,Flu,Influenza,Personal Protective Equipment (PPE),R-PPE,R-Res&Pub,SARS",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/78cc3dc94ca5b2e06d0f99e03b3a7efb.png,Publication,Discover,1,0
1199,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/1199,"Comparing SARS-CoV-2 with SARS-CoV and influenza pandemics","Emergency Management","The objective of this Personal View is to compare transmissibility, hospitalisation, and mortality rates for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) with those of other epidemic coronaviruses, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), and pandemic influenza viruses.
A response to this was published Aug. 11, 2020:
","Petersen, Eskild, Marion Koopmans, Unyeong Go, Davidson H. Hamer, Nicola Petrosillo, Francesco Castelli, Merete Storgaard, Sulien Al Khalili, and Lone Simonsen. ",,,2020-07-03,"2024-03-27 Emergency Management skipped in review – bump to next quarter",,,,,Publication,,2024-07-27,,,,,,,,,,"Petersen, Eskild, Marion Koopmans, Unyeong Go, Davidson H. Hamer, Nicola Petrosillo, Francesco Castelli, Merete Storgaard, Sulien Al Khalili, and Lone Simonsen. 2020. ""Comparing SARS-CoV-2 with SARS-CoV and influenza pandemics."" The Lancet Infectious Diseases.
","Free online on Lancet site.","Summary
The objective of this Personal View is to compare transmissibility, hospitalisation, and mortality rates for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) with those of other epidemic coronaviruses, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), and pandemic influenza viruses. The basic reproductive rate (R0) for SARS-CoV-2 is estimated to be 2·5 (range 1·8–3·6) compared with 2·0–3·0 for SARS-CoV and the 1918 influenza pandemic, 0·9 for MERS-CoV, and 1·5 for the 2009 influenza pandemic. SARS-CoV-2 causes mild or asymptomatic disease in most cases; however, severe to critical illness occurs in a small proportion of infected individuals, with the highest rate seen in people older than 70 years. The measured case fatality rate varies between countries, probably because of differences in testing strategies. Population-based mortality estimates vary widely across Europe, ranging from zero to high. Numbers from the first affected region in Italy, Lombardy, show an all age mortality rate of 154 per 100 000 population. Differences are most likely due to varying demographic structures, among other factors. However, this new virus has a focal dissemination; therefore, some areas have a higher disease burden and are affected more than others for reasons that are still not understood. Nevertheless, early introduction of strict physical distancing and hygiene measures have proven effective in sharply reducing R0 and associated mortality and could in part explain the geographical differences.
",https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(20)30484-9/fulltext,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(20)30484-9/fulltext,,,,"2019-nCoV,Coronavirus,COVID-19,Epidemic,Flu,Influenza,Pandemic,R-EM,R-Res&Pub,SARS",,Publication,Discover,1,0
750,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/750,"Clinical management and infection control of SARS: lessons learned.","Infection Control","The outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 was the first emergence of an important human pathogen in the 21st century.","Cheng, Vincent C. C., Jasper F. W. Chan, Kelvin K. W. To, and K. Y. Yuen.",,,2013-11,"2022-12-07 general asset review - IPC (change R-T&C)",,,,,Publication,,2023-12-10,,,,,,,,,,"Cheng, Vincent C. C., Jasper F. W. Chan, Kelvin K. W. To, and K. Y. Yuen. 2013. ""Clinical management and infection control of SARS: lessons learned."" Antiviral research 100 (2):407-19.","Elsevier Open Access","
The outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 was the first emergence of an important human pathogen in the 21st century. Responding to the epidemic provided clinicians with extensive experience in diagnosing and treating a novel respiratory viral disease. In this article, we review the experience of the SARS epidemic, focusing on measures taken to identify and isolate patients, prevent the transmission of infection to healthcare workers and develop effective therapies. Lessons learned from the SARS epidemic will be especially important in responding to the current emergence of another highly pathogenic human coronavirus, the agent of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and to the recently emerging H7N9 influenza A virus in China. This paper forms part of a symposium in Antiviral Research on ""From SARS to MERS: 10years of research on highly pathogenic human coronaviruses.""
Copyright © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
",https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166354213002246,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23994190,,,,"Clinical Care Guidelines,Coronavirus,Infection Prevention and Control,R-Res&Pub,R-T&C,SARS",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/824d39bbaae330653057c0066f0b27ec.png,Publication,Discover,1,0
730,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/730,"Clinical course and outcomes of critically ill patients with SARS-CoV-2 pneumonia in Wuhan, China: a single-centered, retrospective, observational study","Treatment & Care","An ongoing outbreak of pneumonia associated with the severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) started in December, 2019, in Wuhan, China. ","Yang, Xiaobo, Yuan Yu, Jiqian Xu, Huaqing Shu, Jia'an Xia, Hong Liu, Yongran Wu, Lu Zhang, Zhui Yu, Minghao Fang, Ting Yu, Yaxin Wang, Shangwen Pan, Xiaojing Zou, Shiying Yuan, and You Shang.",,,2020-02-24,"2022-09-27 - general asset review - Treatment & Care group",,,,,Publication,,2025-09-27,,,,,,,,,,"Yang, Xiaobo, Yuan Yu, Jiqian Xu, Huaqing Shu, Jia'an Xia, Hong Liu, Yongran Wu, Lu Zhang, Zhui Yu, Minghao Fang, Ting Yu, Yaxin Wang, Shangwen Pan, Xiaojing Zou, Shiying Yuan, and You Shang. ""Clinical course and outcomes of critically ill patients with SARS-CoV-2 pneumonia in Wuhan, China: a single-centered, retrospective, observational study."" The Lancet Respiratory Medicine.
","Free Online","
Background
An ongoing outbreak of pneumonia associated with the severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) started in December, 2019, in Wuhan, China. Information about critically ill patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection is scarce. We aimed to describe the clinical course and outcomes of critically ill patients with SARS-CoV-2 pneumonia.
Methods
In this single-centered, retrospective, observational study, we enrolled 52 critically ill adult patients with SARS-CoV-2 pneumonia who were admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU) of Wuhan Jin Yin-tan hospital (Wuhan, China) between late December, 2019, and Jan 26, 2020. Demographic data, symptoms, laboratory values, comorbidities, treatments, and clinical outcomes were all collected. Data were compared between survivors and non-survivors. The primary outcome was 28-day mortality, as of Feb 9, 2020. Secondary outcomes included incidence of SARS-CoV-2-related acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and the proportion of patients requiring mechanical ventilation.
Findings
Of 710 patients with SARS-CoV-2 pneumonia, 52 critically ill adult patients were included. The mean age of the 52 patients was 59·7 (SD 13·3) years, 35 (67%) were men, 21 (40%) had chronic illness, 51 (98%) had fever. 32 (61·5%) patients had died at 28 days, and the median duration from admission to the intensive care unit (ICU) to death was 7 (IQR 3–11) days for non-survivors. Compared with survivors, non-survivors were older (64·6 years [11·2] vs 51·9 years [12·9]), more likely to develop ARDS (26 [81%] patients vs 9 [45%] patients), and more likely to receive mechanical ventilation (30 [94%] patients vs 7 [35%] patients), either invasively or non-invasively. Most patients had organ function damage, including 35 (67%) with ARDS, 15 (29%) with acute kidney injury, 12 (23%) with cardiac injury, 15 (29%) with liver dysfunction, and one (2%) with pneumothorax. 37 (71%) patients required mechanical ventilation. Hospital-acquired infection occurred in seven (13·5%) patients.
Interpretation
The mortality of critically ill patients with SARS-CoV-2 pneumonia is considerable. The survival time of the non-survivors is likely to be within 1–2 weeks after ICU admission. Older patients (>65 years) with comorbidities and ARDS are at increased risk of death. The severity of SARS-CoV-2 pneumonia poses great strain on critical care resources in hospitals, especially if they are not adequately staffed or resourced.
Funding
None.
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanres/article/PIIS2213-2600(20)30079-5/fulltext,,,,"2019-nCoV,Clinical Care Guidelines,Coronavirus,COVID-19,R-Res&Pub,R-T&C,SARS,Survivors",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/195c0cd1dbef9092da734ce70378d737.png,Publication,Discover,1,0
738,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/738,"Clinical and epidemiological predictors of transmission in Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)","Infection Control","Only a minority of probable SARS cases caused transmission. We assess if any epidemiological or clinical factors in SARS index patients were associated with increased probability of transmission.","Chen, Mark I. C., Angela L. P. Chow, Arul Earnest, Hoe Nam Leong, and Yee Sin Leo.",,,2006,"2022-12-07 general asset review - IPC (change R-Res)",,,,,Publication,,2023-12-10,,,,,,,,,,"Chen, Mark I. C., Angela L. P. Chow, Arul Earnest, Hoe Nam Leong, and Yee Sin Leo. 2006. ""Clinical and epidemiological predictors of transmission in Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)."" BMC infectious diseases 6:151-.
","Free Online","
Background
Only a minority of probable SARS cases caused transmission. We assess if any epidemiological or clinical factors in SARS index patients were associated with increased probability of transmission.
Methods
We used epidemiological and clinical data on probable SARS patients admitted to Tan Tock Seng Hospital. Using a case-control approach, index patients who had probable SARS who subsequently transmitted the disease to at least one other patient were analysed as ""cases"" against patients with no transmission as ""controls"", using multivariate logistic regression analysis.
Results
98 index patients were available for analysis (22 with transmission, 76 with no transmission). Covariates positively associated with transmission in univariate analysis at p < 0.05 included delay to isolation (Day 7 of illness or later), admission to a non-isolation facility, pre-existing chronic respiratory disease and immunosuppressive disease, need for oxygen, shortness of breath, vomiting, and higher lactate dehydrogenase levels and higher neutrophil counts. In the multivariate analysis, only three factors were significant: delay to isolation, admission to a non-isolation facility and higher lactate dehydrogenase levels of >650 IU/L (OR 6.4, 23.8 and 4.7 respectively).
Conclusion
Clinical and epidemiological factors can help us to explain why transmission was observed in some instances but not in others.
",https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1624840/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17049088,,,,"Airborne Transmission,Coronavirus,Diagnosis,Droplet Transmission,Epidemiology,Isolate,Isolation/Biocontainment,R-Res&Pub,SARS",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/cb6784998ab3dc18f17132a3ed5ad89d.pdf,Publication,Discover,1,0
702,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/702,"Challenges to the system of reserve medical supplies for public health emergencies: reflections on the outbreak of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) epidemic in China.","Emergency Management","On December 31, 2019, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission announced an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), China is now at a critical period in the control of the epidemic.","Wang X., Zhang X., He J.",,,2020-02-17,"2024-03-27 Emergency Management skipped in review – bump to next quarter",,,,,Publication,,2024-07-27,,,,,,,,,,,"Free online via Journal website","
Abstract
On December 31, 2019, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission announced an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), China is now at a critical period in the control of the epidemic. The Chinese Government has been taking a series of rapid, comprehensive, and effective prevention and control measures. As the pandemic has developed, a fact has become apparent: there is a serious dearth of emergency medical supplies, and especially an extreme shortage of personal protective equipment such as masks and medical protective clothing. This is one of the major factors affecting the progress of epidemic prevention and control. Although China has made great efforts to strengthen the ability to quickly respond to public health emergencies since the SARS outbreak in 2003 and it has clarified requirements for emergency supplies through legislation, the emergency reserve supplies program has not been effectively implemented, and there are also deficiencies in the types, quantity, and availability of emergency medical supplies. A sound system of emergency reserve supplies is crucial to the management of public health emergencies. Based on international experiences with pandemic control, the world should emphasize improving the system of emergency reserve medical supplies in the process of establishing and improving public health emergency response systems, and it should promote the establishment of international cooperative programs to jointly deal with public health emergencies of international concern in the future.
","https://doi.org/10.5582/bst.2020.01043 ",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32062645,,,,"2019-nCoV,Coronavirus,COVID-19,Public Health,R-EM,R-Res&Pub,SARS",,Publication,Discover,1,0
780,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/780,"Can we contain the COVID-19 outbreak with the same measures as for SARS?","Infection Control","The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 resulted in more than 8000 cases and 800 deaths. ","Wilder-Smith, Annelies, Calvin J. Chiew, and Vernon J. Lee. ",,,2020-03-05,"2022-12-07 general asset review - IPC",,,,,Publication,,2025-12-10,,,,,,,,,,"Wilder-Smith, Annelies, Calvin J. Chiew, and Vernon J. Lee. 2020. ""Can we contain the COVID-19 outbreak with the same measures as for SARS?"" The Lancet Infectious Diseases.
","Free online on Lancet site.","Summary
The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 resulted in more than 8000 cases and 800 deaths. SARS was eventually contained by means of syndromic surveillance, prompt isolation of patients, strict enforcement of quarantine of all contacts, and in some areas top-down enforcement of community quarantine. By interrupting all human-to-human transmission, SARS was effectively eradicated. By contrast, by Feb 28, 2020, within a matter of 2 months since the beginning of the outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), more than 82 000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 have been reported with more than 2800 deaths. Although there are striking similarities between SARS and COVID-19, the differences in the virus characteristics will ultimately determine whether the same measures for SARS will also be successful for COVID-19. COVID-19 differs from SARS in terms of infectious period, transmissibility, clinical severity, and extent of community spread. Even if traditional public health measures are not able to fully contain the outbreak of COVID-19, they will still be effective in reducing peak incidence and global deaths. Exportations to other countries need not result in rapid large-scale outbreaks, if countries have the political will to rapidly implement countermeasures.
",https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(20)30129-8/fulltext,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(20)30129-8/fulltext,,,,"2019-nCoV,Coronavirus,COVID-19,Epidemic,Infection Prevention and Control,R-IPC,R-Res&Pub,SARS,SARS-CoV-2",,Publication,Discover,1,0
761,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/761,"Availability, consistency and evidence-base of policies and guidelines on the use of mask and respirator to protect hospital health care workers: a global analysis",Research,"Currently there is an ongoing debate and limited evidence on the use of masks and respirators for the prevention of respiratory infections in health care workers (HCWs).","Chughtai, Abrar Ahmad, Holly Seale, and Chandini Raina MacIntyre.",,,2013-05-31,,,,,,Publication,,,,,,,,,,,,"Chughtai, Abrar Ahmad, Holly Seale, and Chandini Raina MacIntyre. 2013. ""Availability, consistency and evidence-base of policies and guidelines on the use of mask and respirator to protect hospital health care workers: a global analysis."" BMC Research Notes 6 (1):216.
","Free online Open Access","
BACKGROUND:
Currently there is an ongoing debate and limited evidence on the use of masks and respirators for the prevention of respiratory infections in health care workers (HCWs). This study aimed to examine available policies and guidelines around the use of masks and respirators in HCWs and to describe areas of consistency between guidelines, as well as gaps in the recommendations, with reference to the WHO and the CDC guidelines.
METHODS:
Policies and guidelines related to mask and respirator use for the prevention of influenza, SARS and TB were examined. Guidelines from the World Health Organization (WHO), the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), three high-income countries and six low/middle-income countries were selected.
RESULTS:
Uniform recommendations are made by the WHO and the CDC in regards to protecting HCWs against seasonal influenza (a mask for low risk situations and a respirator for high risk situations) and TB (use of a respirator). However, for pandemic influenza and SARS, the WHO recommends mask use in low risk and respirators in high risk situations, whereas, the CDC recommends respirators in both low and high risk situations. Amongst the nine countries reviewed, there are variations in the recommendations for all three diseases. While, some countries align with the WHO recommendations, others align with those made by the CDC. The choice of respirator and the level of filtering ability vary amongst the guidelines and the different diseases. Lastly, none of the policies discuss reuse, extended use or the use of cloth masks.
CONCLUSION:
Currently, there are significant variations in the policies and recommendations around mask and respirator use for protection against influenza, SARS and TB. These differences may reflect the scarcity of level-one evidence available to inform policy development. The lack of any guidelines on the use of cloth masks, despite widespread use in many low and middle-income countries, remains a policy gap. Health organizations and countries should jointly evaluate the available evidence, prioritize research to inform evidence gaps, and develop consistent policy on masks and respirator use in the health care setting.
",https://bmcresnotes.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1756-0500-6-216,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23725338,,,,"Airborne Transmission,Guidance Document,Mask,Masks,N95,R-Res&Pub,Respiratory Pathogen,SARS",https://repository.netecweb.org/files/original/59a7477c357bb399e8935db18e2b9990.pdf,Publication,Discover,1,0
1052,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/1052,"Association between Angiotensin Blockade and Incidence of Influenza in the United Kingdom",Research,"Some researchers have hypothesized that drugs that interfere with the renin–angiotensin–aldosterone system (RAAS), including angiotensin-converting–enzyme (ACE) inhibitors and angiotensin-receptor blockers (ARBs), may increase susceptibility to coronaviruses. ","Chung, Sheng-Chia, Rui Providencia, and Reecha Sofat.",,,2020-05-08,,,,,,Publication,,,,,,,,,,,,"Chung, Sheng-Chia, Rui Providencia, and Reecha Sofat. 2020. ""Association between Angiotensin Blockade and Incidence of Influenza in the United Kingdom."" New England Journal of Medicine.
","Free online on NEJM",,https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc2005396,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc2005396,,,,"2019-nCoV,Coronavirus,COVID-19,Flu,Influenza,R-Res&Pub,SARS,SARS-CoV-2",,Publication,Discover,1,0
60,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/60,"ASPR TRACIE SARS/MERS",General,"SARS/MERS | Technical Resources | TRACIE","ASPR TRACIE",,,2018-01-08,"2022-12-07 general asset review - IPC",,,,,,,2023-12-10,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://asprtracie.hhs.gov/technical-resources/44/SARS-MERS/44,,,,"Coronavirus,Federal,Identify,Infection Prevention and Control,Inform,Isolate,Lab,Laboratory,MERS-CoV,Patient Care,Person Under Investigation (PUI),Public Health,Quarantine,R-IPC,Respiratory Pathogen,SARS,Specimen Collection",,Hyperlink,Discover,1,0
673,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/673,"Another Decade, Another Coronavirus",General,"For the third time in as many decades, a zoonotic coronavirus has crossed species to infect human populations. This virus, provisionally called 2019-nCoV, was first identified in Wuhan, China, in persons exposed to a seafood or wet market.","Stanley Perlman",,,2020-01-24,"2024-03-28 by J. Mundy – General subject – setting first review day 2025-01-01",,,,,Publication,,2025-01-01,,,,,,,,,,"Perlman, Stanley. 2020. ""Another Decade, Another Coronavirus."" New England Journal of Medicine.","Free on journal website",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMe2001126,,,,"Coronavirus,COVID-19,Diagnosis,MERS-CoV,R-Gen,R-Res&Pub,SARS,Zoonotic",,Publication,Discover,1,0
706,https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/706,"An integrative review of the limited evidence on international travel bans as an emerging infectious disease disaster control measure.",Research,"In our increasingly interconnected world, the potential for emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) to spread globally is of paramount concern.","Errett, Nicole A., Lauren M. Sauer, and Lainie Rutkow.",,,2020-02,"2022-12-07 general asset review - IPC (move to R-Res)",,,,,Publication,,2023-12-10,,,,,,,,,,"Errett, Nicole A., Lauren M. Sauer, and Lainie Rutkow. 2020. ""An integrative review of the limited evidence on international travel bans as an emerging infectious disease disaster control measure."" J Emerg Manag 18 (1):7-14.
","Free on journal website","
Abstract
In our increasingly interconnected world, the potential for emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) to spread globally is of paramount concern. Travel bans-herein defined as the complete restriction of travel from at least one geographic region to at least one other international geographic region-are a potential policy solution to control the global spread of disease. The social, economic, and health-related consequences of travel bans, as well as the available evidence on the effectiveness of travel restrictions in preventing the global spread of influenza, have been previously described. However, the effectiveness of travel bans in reducing the spread of noninfluenza EIDs, characterized by different rates and modes of transmission, is less well understood. This study employs an integrative review approach to summarize the minimal evidence on effectiveness of travel bans to decrease the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle Eastern respiratory syndrome (MERS), Ebola virus disease (EVD), and Zika virus disease (ZVD). We describe and qualify the evidence presented in six modeling studies that assess the effectiveness of travel bans in controlling these noninfluenza EID events. We conclude that there is an urgent need for additional research to inform policy decisions on the use of travel bans and other control measures to control noninfluenza EIDs in advance of the next outbreak.
",https://www.wmpllc.org/ojs/index.php/jem/article/view/2688,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32031668,,,,"Ebola,Infection Prevention and Control,MERS-CoV,R-Res&Pub,SARS,Special Pathogens",,Publication,Discover,1,0