In our increasingly interconnected world, the potential for emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) to spread globally is of paramount concern. Travel bans-herein defined as the complete restriction of travel from at least one geographic region to at least one other international geographic region-are a potential policy solution to control the global spread of disease. The social, economic, and health-related consequences of travel bans, as well as the available evidence on the effectiveness of travel restrictions in preventing the global spread of influenza, have been previously described. However, the effectiveness of travel bans in reducing the spread of noninfluenza EIDs, characterized by different rates and modes of transmission, is less well understood. This study employs an integrative review approach to summarize the minimal evidence on effectiveness of travel bans to decrease the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle Eastern respiratory syndrome (MERS), Ebola virus disease (EVD), and Zika virus disease (ZVD). We describe and qualify the evidence presented in six modeling studies that assess the effectiveness of travel bans in controlling these noninfluenza EID events. We conclude that there is an urgent need for additional research to inform policy decisions on the use of travel bans and other control measures to control noninfluenza EIDs in advance of the next outbreak.
Currently there is an ongoing debate and limited evidence on the use of masks and respirators for the prevention of respiratory infections in health care workers (HCWs). This study aimed to examine available policies and guidelines around the use of masks and respirators in HCWs and to describe areas of consistency between guidelines, as well as gaps in the recommendations, with reference to the WHO and the CDC guidelines.
Policies and guidelines related to mask and respirator use for the prevention of influenza, SARS and TB were examined. Guidelines from the World Health Organization (WHO), the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), three high-income countries and six low/middle-income countries were selected.
Uniform recommendations are made by the WHO and the CDC in regards to protecting HCWs against seasonal influenza (a mask for low risk situations and a respirator for high risk situations) and TB (use of a respirator). However, for pandemic influenza and SARS, the WHO recommends mask use in low risk and respirators in high risk situations, whereas, the CDC recommends respirators in both low and high risk situations. Amongst the nine countries reviewed, there are variations in the recommendations for all three diseases. While, some countries align with the WHO recommendations, others align with those made by the CDC. The choice of respirator and the level of filtering ability vary amongst the guidelines and the different diseases. Lastly, none of the policies discuss reuse, extended use or the use of cloth masks.
Currently, there are significant variations in the policies and recommendations around mask and respirator use for protection against influenza, SARS and TB. These differences may reflect the scarcity of level-one evidence available to inform policy development. The lack of any guidelines on the use of cloth masks, despite widespread use in many low and middle-income countries, remains a policy gap. Health organizations and countries should jointly evaluate the available evidence, prioritize research to inform evidence gaps, and develop consistent policy on masks and respirator use in the health care setting.
On December 31, 2019, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission announced an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), China is now at a critical period in the control of the epidemic. The Chinese Government has been taking a series of rapid, comprehensive, and effective prevention and control measures. As the pandemic has developed, a fact has become apparent: there is a serious dearth of emergency medical supplies, and especially an extreme shortage of personal protective equipment such as masks and medical protective clothing. This is one of the major factors affecting the progress of epidemic prevention and control. Although China has made great efforts to strengthen the ability to quickly respond to public health emergencies since the SARS outbreak in 2003 and it has clarified requirements for emergency supplies through legislation, the emergency reserve supplies program has not been effectively implemented, and there are also deficiencies in the types, quantity, and availability of emergency medical supplies. A sound system of emergency reserve supplies is crucial to the management of public health emergencies. Based on international experiences with pandemic control, the world should emphasize improving the system of emergency reserve medical supplies in the process of establishing and improving public health emergency response systems, and it should promote the establishment of international cooperative programs to jointly deal with public health emergencies of international concern in the future.
Only a minority of probable SARS cases caused transmission. We assess if any epidemiological or clinical factors in SARS index patients were associated with increased probability of transmission.
We used epidemiological and clinical data on probable SARS patients admitted to Tan Tock Seng Hospital. Using a case-control approach, index patients who had probable SARS who subsequently transmitted the disease to at least one other patient were analysed as "cases" against patients with no transmission as "controls", using multivariate logistic regression analysis.
98 index patients were available for analysis (22 with transmission, 76 with no transmission). Covariates positively associated with transmission in univariate analysis at p < 0.05 included delay to isolation (Day 7 of illness or later), admission to a non-isolation facility, pre-existing chronic respiratory disease and immunosuppressive disease, need for oxygen, shortness of breath, vomiting, and higher lactate dehydrogenase levels and higher neutrophil counts. In the multivariate analysis, only three factors were significant: delay to isolation, admission to a non-isolation facility and higher lactate dehydrogenase levels of >650 IU/L (OR 6.4, 23.8 and 4.7 respectively).
Clinical and epidemiological factors can help us to explain why transmission was observed in some instances but not in others.
The outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 was the first emergence of an important human pathogen in the 21st century. Responding to the epidemic provided clinicians with extensive experience in diagnosing and treating a novel respiratory viral disease. In this article, we review the experience of the SARS epidemic, focusing on measures taken to identify and isolate patients, prevent the transmission of infection to healthcare workers and develop effective therapies. Lessons learned from the SARS epidemic will be especially important in responding to the current emergence of another highly pathogenic human coronavirus, the agent of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and to the recently emerging H7N9 influenza A virus in China. This paper forms part of a symposium in Antiviral Research on "From SARS to MERS: 10years of research on highly pathogenic human coronaviruses."
Copyright © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Hospital isolation rooms are vital for the containment (when under negative pressure) of patients with, or the protection (when under positive pressure) of patients, from airborne infectious agents. Such facilities were essential for the management of highly contagious patients during the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreaks and the more recent 2009 A/H1N1 influenza pandemic. Many different types of door designs are used in the construction of such isolation rooms, which may be related to the space available and affordability. Using colored food dye as a tracer, the qualitative effects of door-opening motions on the dissemination of potentially contaminated air into and out of a single isolation room were visualized and filmed using Reynolds-number-equivalent, small-scale, water-tank models fitted with programmable door-opening and moving human figure motions. Careful scaling considerations involved in the design and construction of these water-tank models enabled these results to be accurately extrapolated to the full-scale situation. Four simple types of door design were tested: variable speed single and double, sliding and hinged doors, in combination with the moving human figure. The resulting video footage was edited, synchronized and presented in a series of split-screen formats. From these experiments, it is clear that double-hinged doors pose the greatest risk of leakage into or out of the room, followed by (in order of decreasing risk) single-hinged, double-sliding and single-sliding doors. The relative effect of the moving human figure on spreading any potential contamination was greatest with the sliding doors, as the bulk airflows induced were large relative to those resulting from these door-opening motions. However, with the hinged doors, the airflows induced by these door-opening motions were significantly greater. Further experiments involving a simulated ventilated environment are required, but from these findings alone, it appears that sliding-doors are far more effective for hospital isolation room containment.
Abstract
The emergence and rapid global spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus in 2002–2003 prompted efforts by modelers to characterize SARS epidemiology and inform control policies. We overview and discuss models for emerging infectious diseases (EIDs), provide a critical survey of SARS modeling literature, and discuss promising future directions for research. We reconcile discrepancies between published estimates of the basic reproductive number R0 for SARS (a crucial epidemiologic parameter), discuss insights regarding SARS control measures that have emerged uniquely from a modeling approach, and argue that high priorities for future modeling of SARS and similar respiratory EIDs should include informing quarantine policy and better understanding the impact of population heterogeneity on transmission patterns.
Emergence of many emerging or re-emerging infectious diseases have occurred over the past decade, some of which are major public threat. SARS, MERS-CoV, highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1), Ebola virus disease have raised concerns because of their virulence, their mortality, and/or their modality of transmission, or their impact on maternofoetal transmission (Zika virus). The witness of these emergences have conducted health authorities to have policies and plans and to imagine new organizations for health systems in order to identify any case of highly communicable virulent disease for immediate isolation, and adequate management.
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In healthcare, the goal of personal protective equipment (PPE) is to protect healthcare personnel (HCP) and patients from body fluids and infectious organisms via contact, droplet, or airborne transmission. The critical importance of using PPE properly is highlighted by 2 potentially fatal viral infections, severe acute respiratory syndrome–associated coronavirus and Ebola virus, where HCP became infected while caring for patients due to errors in the use of PPE. However, PPE in dealing with less dangerous, but highly infectious organisms is important as well. This work proposes a framework to test and evaluate PPE with a focus on gown design.
An observational study identified issues with potential for contamination related to gown use. After redesigning the existing gown, a high-fidelity patient simulator study with 40 HCP as participants evaluated the gown redesign using 2 commonly performed tasks. Variables of interest were nonadherence to procedural standards, use problems with the gown during task performance, and usability and cognitive task load ratings of the standard and redesigned gowns.
While no differences were found in terms of nonadherence and use problems between the current and the redesigned gown, differences in usability and task load ratings suggested that the redesigned gown is perceived more favorably by HCP.
This work proposes a framework to guide the evaluation of PPE. The results suggest that the current design of the PPE gown can be improved in usability and user satisfaction. Although our data did not find an increase in adherence to protocol when using the redesigned gown, it is likely that higher usability and lower task load could result in higher adherence over longer periods of use.
The evolution of new and reemerging historic virulent strains of respiratory viruses from animal reservoirs is a significant threat to human health. Inefficient human-to-human transmission of zoonotic strains may initially limit the spread of transmission, but an infection may be contracted by touching contaminated surfaces. Enveloped viruses are often susceptible to environmental stresses, but the human coronaviruses responsible for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) have recently caused increasing concern of contact transmission during outbreaks. We report here that pathogenic human coronavirus 229E remained infectious in a human lung cell culture model following at least 5 days of persistence on a range of common nonbiocidal surface materials, including polytetrafluoroethylene (Teflon; PTFE), polyvinyl chloride (PVC), ceramic tiles, glass, silicone rubber, and stainless steel. We have shown previously that noroviruses are destroyed on copper alloy surfaces. In this new study, human coronavirus 229E was rapidly inactivated on a range of copper alloys (within a few minutes for simulated fingertip contamination) and Cu/Zn brasses were very effective at lower copper concentration. Exposure to copper destroyed the viral genomes and irreversibly affected virus morphology, including disintegration of envelope and dispersal of surface spikes. Cu(I) and Cu(II) moieties were responsible for the inactivation, which was enhanced by reactive oxygen species generation on alloy surfaces, resulting in even faster inactivation than was seen with nonenveloped viruses on copper. Consequently, copper alloy surfaces could be employed in communal areas and at any mass gatherings to help reduce transmission of respiratory viruses from contaminated surfaces and protect the public health.
Respiratory viruses are responsible for more deaths globally than any other infectious agent. Animal coronaviruses that "host jump" to humans result in severe infections with high mortality, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and, more recently, Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). We show here that a closely related human coronavirus, 229E, which causes upper respiratory tract infection in healthy individuals and serious disease in patients with comorbidities, remained infectious on surface materials common to public and domestic areas for several days. The low infectious dose means that this is a significant infection risk to anyone touching a contaminated surface. However, rapid inactivation, irreversible destruction of viral RNA, and massive structural damage were observed in coronavirus exposed to copper and copper alloy surfaces. Incorporation of copper alloy surfaces in conjunction with effective cleaning regimens and good clinical practice could help to control transmission of respiratory coronaviruses, including MERS and SARS.
Copyright © 2015 Warnes et al.
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In the 2003 Toronto SARS outbreak, SARS-CoV was transmitted in hospitals despite adherence to infection control procedures. Considerable controversy resulted regarding which procedures and behaviours were associated with the greatest risk of SARS-CoV transmission.
A retrospective cohort study was conducted to identify risk factors for transmission of SARS-CoV during intubation from laboratory confirmed SARS patients to HCWs involved in their care. All SARS patients requiring intubation during the Toronto outbreak were identified. All HCWs who provided care to intubated SARS patients during treatment or transportation and who entered a patient room or had direct patient contact from 24 hours before to 4 hours after intubation were eligible for this study. Data was collected on patients by chart review and on HCWs by interviewer-administered questionnaire. Generalized estimating equation (GEE) logistic regression models and classification and regression trees (CART) were used to identify risk factors for SARS transmission.
45 laboratory-confirmed intubated SARS patients were identified. Of the 697 HCWs involved in their care, 624 (90%) participated in the study. SARS-CoV was transmitted to 26 HCWs from 7 patients; 21 HCWs were infected by 3 patients. In multivariate GEE logistic regression models, presence in the room during fiberoptic intubation (OR = 2.79, p = .004) or ECG (OR = 3.52, p = .002), unprotected eye contact with secretions (OR = 7.34, p = .001), patient APACHE II score > or = 20 (OR = 17.05, p = .009) and patient Pa0(2)/Fi0(2) ratio < or = 59 (OR = 8.65, p = .001) were associated with increased risk of transmission of SARS-CoV. In CART analyses, the four covariates which explained the greatest amount of variation in SARS-CoV transmission were covariates representing individual patients.
Close contact with the airway of severely ill patients and failure of infection control practices to prevent exposure to respiratory secretions were associated with transmission of SARS-CoV. Rates of transmission of SARS-CoV varied widely among patients.
Four coronaviruses (HCoV-229E, HCoV-OC43, HCoV-NL63, HCoV-HKU1) are endemic in humans and mainly associated with mild respiratory illnesses; whereas the other two coronaviruses [Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV)] present as emerging infections causing severe respiratory syndrome. Coronaviruses evolve by accumulation of point mutations and recombination of genomes among different strains or species. Mammalian coronaviruses including those infect humans are evolved from bat coronaviruses. While SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV are genetically closely related to bat coronaviruses, intermediate host(s) is (are) likely to be involved in the emergence and cross-species transmission of these novel human viruses. High prevalence of SARS-like coronaviruses have been found from masked palm civet cats and raccoon dogs collected from markets around the time of outbreaks in humans, but these animals are likely to be a transient accidental host rather than a persisting reservoir. More research is needed to elucidate the ecology of coronaviruses. Vigilance and surveillance should be maintained to promptly identify newly emerged coronaviruses.
Background Since December 29, 2019, pneumonia infection with 2019-nCoV has rapidly spread out from Wuhan, Hubei Province, China to most others provinces and other counties. However, the transmission dynamics of 2019-nCoV remain unclear.
Methods Data of confirmed 2019-nCoV cases before January 23, 2020 were collected from medical records, epidemiological investigations or official websites. Data of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) cases in Guangdong Province during 2002-2003 were obtained from Guangdong Provincial Center for Disease Control and Prevention (GDCDC). Exponential Growth (EG) and maximum likelihood estimation (ML) were applied to estimate the reproductive number (R) of 2019-nCoV and SARS.
Findings As of January 23, 2020, a total of 830 confirmed 2019-nCoV cases were identified across China, and 9 cases were reported overseas. The average incubation duration of 2019-nCoV infection was 4.8days. The average period from onset of symptoms to isolation of 2019-nCoV and SARS cases were 2.9 and 4.2 days, respectively. The R values of 2019-nCoV were 2.90 (95%CI: 2.32-3.63) and 2.92 (95%CI: 2.28-3.67) estimated using EG and ML respectively, while the corresponding R values of SARS-CoV were 1.77 (95%CI: 1.37-2.27) and 1.85 (95%CI: 1.32-2.49). We observe a decreasing trend of the period from onset to isolation and R values of both 2019-nCoV and SARS-CoV.
Interpretation The 2019-nCoV may have a higher pandemic risk than SARS broken out in 2003. The implemented public-health efforts have significantly decreased the pandemic risk of 2019-nCoV. However, more rigorous control and prevention strategies and measures to contain its further spread.
Funding National Key Research and Development Program of China, Science and Technology Program of Guangdong Province, and Guangzhou Science and technology Plan Project.